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Introduction
During the second half of the 1990s, the United States experienced the con-
tinuation of one of the longest economic expansions. The distinguishing
characteristics of this period can be summarized as follows.
1. High growth rates of output, employment, investment and wages.
2. High growth rates of labor productivity.
3. A stock market boom.
4. A financing boom for new and expanding firms.
5. A sense of moving towards a “New Economy”.
In this paper, we propose an interpretation of these events in which the
prospect of a New Economy plays a key role in generating the other events.
More specifically, we show that the mere prospect of high future productivity
growth can generate a stock market boom, a financing boom for new firms,
an economic expansion as well as sizable gains in current productivity of la-
bor. There are two main ingredients to our story: financing constraints due
to limited contract enforceability, and firm-level diminishing returns to scale.
Financing constraints generate an endogenous size distribution of firms. Di-
minishing returns make aggregate productivity dependent on the size dis-
tribution of firms. In particular, a more concentrated firm-size distribution
results in higher aggregate labor productivity.
In our model, an initial improvement in the prospects for future pro-
ductivity growth generates the following set of reactions. First, the market
value of firms is driven up by the increase in the expected discounted value
of profits. Because of the higher market value, new firms find their financ-
ing constraints relaxed and are able to operate with a higher initial capital
investment and employment. At the aggregate level, the increase in labor
demand from the new firms pushes up the wage rate and forces existing un-
constrained firms to adjust their production plans to increase the marginal
productivity of labor. Therefore, while newer and smaller firms expand their
employment, older and larger firms contract over time. This generates a more
concentrated economy-wide size distribution of firms. Given the concavity of
the production function, the more concentrated firm-size distribution leads
to higher aggregate productivity of labor. This “reallocation effect” is in
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addition to the increase in productivity due to capital deepening. We find
that a reasonably calibrated model can generate a cumulative productivity
gain of about 2 percent over a 5 year period, with 1 percent attributable to
the reallocation effect and 1 percent to capital deepening. This productiv-
ity gain is driven solely by the prospects of higher productivity growth and
would arise even if the increase in technological growth would never occur.1
The theoretical framework consists of a general equilibrium model in
which investment projects are carried out by individual entrepreneurs and
financed through optimal contracts with investors. The structure of the
optimal contract is complicated by limited enforceability: the entrepreneur
controls the resources of the firm and can use these resources for his own
private benefit. The limited enforceability of contracts implies that new in-
vestment projects are initially small, but then increase gradually until they
reach the optimal scale. This class of models has shown to be able to explain
several important features of firm growth dynamics. See Marcet & Marimon
(1992), Albuquerque & Hopenhayn (1997), Cooley, Marimon, & Quadrini
(2000), Quintin (2000) and Monge (2001).
We model changes in expectations as a regime switch in the stochastic
process for the growth rate of technology. This regime change leads to higher
expected future growth rates while the current growth rate does not change.
To keep our analysis focused, we abstract from other channels emphasized in
the literature through which expectations may have an immediate impact on
current economic activity such as time-to-build, capital adjustment costs, or
consumption smoothing. We will discuss these alternative models in Section
6. Also, it should be clear that we do not believe that the economic expan-
sion experienced by the U.S. economy during the second half of the 1990s
was entirely driven by expectations of future higher productivity growth.
Rather, we see our explanation as complementary to others, emphasizing,
for instance, actual improvement in firm level technology that, for simplicity,
we omit from the analysis.
Section 1 reviews the main events experienced by the U.S. economy in
the 1990s. Section 2 contains an overview of how these facts are linked in our
theoretical model and provides the intuition for the main results. Section 3
presents the model and Section 4 contains the quantitative analysis. Section
1Caballero & Hammour (2002) also study the macroeconomic implications of a stock
market boom. Their transmission mechanism, however, does not relay on financial con-
straints. Another difference is that in their model the stock market boom is generate by
asset bubbles while in our model there are no bubbles.
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5 provides additional empirical evidence in support of our theory and Section
6 discusses alternative models. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
1 Facts about the 1990s
In this section we provide some quantitative evidence about the above-
mentioned five characteristics of the US economy during the second half
of the 1990s.
Macroeconomic expansion: The second half of the 1990s features the
continuation of one of the longest economic expansions in recent US history
with an acceleration in the growth rates of output, employment, investment
and wages. Figure 1 presents the growth rates of these four aggregates for
the period 1990-2001.
Productivity growth: Baily (2002) surveys three of the most widely no-
ticed studies that estimate the sources of productivity growth during the
second half of the 1990s. As a summary, Table 1 reports averages across
these three sets of estimates, namely, updated numbers from Oliner & Sichel
(2000), the Economic Report of the President (2001) and Jorgenson, Ho, &
Stiroh (2001). These numbers incorporate the downward revision of GDP
made in the summer of 2001.
Table 1: Decomposition of Growth in Output Per Hour, 1995-2000.
Average annual growth 1995-2000 2.55
Average annual growth 1973-1995 1.40
Acceleration of growth= 1.15%
Contribution of labor quality -0.01
Contribution of MFP in computer-sector 0.31
Contribution of capital deepening 0.43
Contribution of MFP outside computer-sector 0.42
Source: Baily (2002)
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Output per hour in the nonfarm private business sector has grown at
an annual rate of 2.55% during the period 1995-00 compared to a 1.40%
growth rate during the period 1973–95. Therefore, there has been an accel-
eration of 1.15%. Abstracting from labor quality, which counts for a small
decline (-0.01%), the table decomposes this acceleration in three components.
The first component is the growth in multifactor productivity (MFP) in the
computer sector. The estimate for this is 0.31%. Capital deepening, which
results from the investment boom especially in computer equipment, counts
for 0.43%. The remaining 0.42% is the structural acceleration in multifac-
tor productivity outside the computer-producing sector.2 Our analysis will
focus on the last two components which accounted for somewhat over 4% of
cumulative growth during the period 1995-00.3
Stock market boom: Equity prices have registered a spectacular increase
during the second half of the 1990 as shown in Figure 2. During that period,
the S&P500, the Dow Jones Industrial and the Nasdaq Composite indexes
have more than doubled. One of the goals of this paper is to relate this stock
market boom to the growth in labor productivity during this period.
Figure 3 plots the productivity growth and the price-earning ratio in the
post-war period. The post-war period can be divided in three sub periods:
the “golden age” of rapid productivity growth between 1950:2 and 1972:2,
the “slow down period” from 1972:2 to 1995:5, and the “revival period”
since 1995:4. The identification and labelling of these three sub-periods are
taken from Gordon (2001). Clearly, there is a strong positive association
between productivity growth and price-earnings ratios.4 Although the causal
2Gordon (2001) further decomposes this last component into cyclical and structural,
arguing that most of the gain is cyclical. Given that such a decomposition depends on ad-
ditional auxiliary assumptions, we do not distinguish here between these two components
although we will make this distinction in our theoretical framework.
3Several studies (see for example Brynjolfsson & Hitt (2000), Jorgenson & Stiroh (2000),
Oliner & Sichel (2000)), interpret the increase in multifactor productivity outside the
computers sector as the result of the network and externality advantages brought about by
information and communication technologies. At the same time, the increase in investment
and the subsequent capital deepening was driven by the fall in prices of computers. The
goal of this paper is to provide another interpretation of the driving forces underlying the
improvement in multifactor productivity and capital deepening.
4Because the subdivision in the three sub-periods is to some extent arbitrary, we have
also computed the trends of these two series using a low-pass filter. The pattern of these
trends displays a similar picture.
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relationship can go in both directions, in this paper we will emphasize the
channel going from asset prices to labor productivity.
Financing boom for new firms: Figure 4 illustrates the financing boom
for new firms with the evolution of the Nasdaq composite index and the
amount of venture capital investment. While the association between the
value of firms quoted in Nasdaq and venture capital investment is not sur-
prising, it is worth to be emphasized because it shows the close connection
between the value that the market attributes to investment projects and the
volume of funds injected in these projects. At the beginning of 2000, the
size of the venture capital market has reached dimensions of macroeconomic
significance. Although these funds were only about 1 percent of GDP, in
terms of net private domestic investment they are about 15 percent. More-
over, the funds injected through venture capital are only part of the funds
raised and invested by these firms. Some of these firms, in fact, raise funds
through IPOs. As shown in Figure 5, the number of IPOs and the funds
raised increased during the 1990s. Therefore, there has been a clear boom in
the financing of new and expanding firms.
“New Economy”: While more elusive, the sense of moving towards a New
Economy has been manifest in many ways. Shiller (2000) contains a detailed
account of this tendency linked, among other things, to the emergence of the
internet and the ever wider use of computer technology. Fed chairman Mr.
Greenspan has been making the case for an upward shift in trend productivity
growth driven by new equipment and management techniques since 1995.
See, for example, Ip & Schlesinger (2001). The same article also describes
how this view spread across the Federal Open Market Committee. Referring
to a speech of Fed member Mr. Meyer, the article reports:
“‘we can confidently say ... that, since 1995, actual produc-
tivity growth has increased.’ At the time he suggested that he
believed the economy could annually grow by overall as much as
3% without inciting inflation, up from his longtime prior estimate
of a 2.5% limit. Soon, thereafter, he indicated that perhaps the
right number was 3.5% to 4%.”
The goal of this paper is to link these events in a unified framework. The
driving force in our analysis will be the expectations of a New Economy.
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2 Overview of the main results
In this section we describe informally the model’s main mechanisms that
link the events documented above. A detailed analysis of the model will be
conducted in the following sections.
Suppose that there is a fixed number of workers with a constant supply of
labor and a fixed number of firms. All firms run the same decreasing return-
to-scale technology F (L) with the input of labor L as plotted in Figure 6.
Given the concavity of the production function, there is an optimal input
of labor which is determined by the equilibrium wage rate. In the absence
of financial constraints, all firms will employ the same input of labor L.
However, if the employment of labor requires capital, the presence of financial
constraints may limit the ability of the firm to employ L. Assume there is
a given fraction of firms that are financially constrained and operate at a
sub-optimal scale L, and the remaining fraction includes firms that are not
constrained and operate at the optimal scale L. This is shown in panel a of
Figure 6
F (L)
F (L)
LL
-
6
r
   
   
   
a) Before the price boom
F (L
′
)
F (L′)
L
′L′
-
6
r



b) After the price boom
Figure 6: Reallocation of workers and productivity effect.
Because the production function is concave, this allocation of labor is
clearly inefficient. By reallocating workers from unconstrained firms to con-
strained firms, aggregate production increases. Because the total supply of
labor has not changed, the average productivity of labor must be higher.
The main point of the paper is to show that a stock market boom can gen-
erate a reallocation of workers similar to the one described above. The idea
6
is that, when the value of a new firm increases, the firm is able to get more
initial financing from investors. This, in turn, increases the average employ-
ment of constrained firms, which is captured by the shift to the right of L in
panel b. The increase in the demand of labor coming from constrained firms
increases the wage rate which in turn reduces the optimal (unconstrained)
input of labor L. This is captured in the graph by the shift to the left of
L. As a consequence of the increase in the size of constrained firms and
the decrease in the size of unconstrained firms, the aggregate productivity of
labor increases. Therefore, an asset price boom can generate a productivity
improvement and an economic expansion.5
In the example described above we have made two special assumptions.
The first is that labor is perfectly complementary to capital. The relaxation
of this assumption may increase the impact of an asset price boom on the
productivity of labor. This is because higher wages may induce firms to use
more capital per unit of labor (capital deepening). The second assumption is
the constancy of the aggregate supply of labor. Although in the general model
we maintain the assumption that the number of workers is fixed, working
time depends on the wage rate. The relaxation of this second assumption
will weaken the impact of an asset price boom on the productivity of labor.
To see this, consider the extreme case in which labor is perfectly elastic. In
this case the wage is not affected by the asset price increase and L does
not change. However, the size of constrained firms L will still move to the
right. This would imply that the productivity of constrained firms declines
while the productivity of unconstrained firms remain unchanged. This could
induce a fall rather than an increase in the aggregate productivity of labor.6
Based on these considerations, we summarize here the main factors that
determine the quantitative extent of a productivity improvement:
• Returns to scale: If the degree of concavity in the production function
is high, the reallocation of labor will have large effects on productivity.
5If we were to compute the Solow residuals using a constant return to scale function,
z·L, applied to aggregate data, the improvement in labor productivity would be interpreted
as an exogenous increase in z, rather than generated endogenously by the reallocation of
resources. We will expand on this point in Section 4.
6The productivity of labor does not necessarily decrease. Even though the productivity
of constrained firms decreases, their employment share increases. Consequently, the impact
on aggregate productivity depends on whether the decrease in the individual productivity
of constrained firms dominates their increase in the share of employment.
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In the extreme case in which F (L) is linear, the reallocation of labor
has no effect on productivity beyond capital deepening.
• Size heterogeneity: If the size of constrained firms is small relative to
unconstrained firms, the productivity differential is large. This implies
that the reallocation of labor can generate a large productivity gain.
The number of constrained firms is obviously also important.
• Elasticity of labor: If the elasticity of labor is small, the expansion
of constrained firms generates a large increase in the wage rate which
in turn induces a large fall in the employment of unconstrained firms.
Therefore, the productivity improvement will be higher.
3 The model
Agents and preferences: The economy is populated by a continuum of
agents of total mass 1. In each period, a fraction 1 − α of them is replaced
by newborn agents. Therefore, α is the survival probability. A fraction e of
the newborn agents have an investment project and, if they get financing,
they become entrepreneurs. The remaining fraction, 1− e, become workers.
Agents maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
α
1 + r
)t (
ct − ϕt(ht)
)
(1)
where r is the intertemporal discount rate, ct is consumption, ht are working
hours, ϕt(ht) is the disutility from working. The function ϕt is strictly convex
and satisfies ϕt(0) = 0. We also assume that this function is time dependent
to guarantee a balanced growth path. We will describe the precise form of
this function below.
Given the assumption of risk neutrality, r will be the risk-free interest
rate earned on assets deposited in a financial intermediary.7 Denoting by wt
the wage rate, the supply of labor is determined by the condition ϕ′t(ht) =
wt/(1 + r). The wage rate is discounted because wages are paid in the next
period as specified below. For entrepreneurs ht = 0 and their utility depends
only on consumption.
7On each unit of assets deposited in a financial intermediary, agents receive (1 + r)/α
if they survive to the next period and zero otherwise. Therefore, the expected return for
the financial intermediary is r.
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Investment project: An investment project requires an initial fixed in-
vestment κt, which is sunk, and generates revenues according to:
yt = zt · F (kt, lt)θ (2)
where yt is the output generated with the inputs of capital kt and labor lt.
The variable zt is the same for all firms and we will refer to this variable
as the “aggregate level of technology”. The function F is strictly increasing
with respect to both arguments and homogeneous of degree 1. The parameter
θ is smaller than 1, and therefore, the revenue function displays decreasing
returns to scale. Capital depreciates at rate δ.
With probability 1 − φ the project becomes unproductive. Therefore,
there are two circumstances in which the firm is liquidated: When the en-
trepreneur dies and when the project becomes unproductive. The survival
probability is αφ. The probability φ changes stochastically according to a
first order Markov process. This process will be structured such that the
survival of the firm declines with its age.
Financial contract and repudiation: To finance a new project the en-
trepreneur enters into a contractual relationship with one or more investors.
The financial contract is not fully enforceable.8 At the end of the period, the
entrepreneur has the ability to divert the firm resources (capital and labor)
to generate a private return according to the function:
D(zt, kt, wt) = λ · yt = λ · zt · F (kt, lt(zt, kt, wt))θ (3)
In this case, the firm becomes unproductive and capital fully depreciates. The
fact that the firm becomes unproductive in case of diversion makes the issue of
renegotiation irrelevant (the production capacity is lost). This specification
captures the notion that the default value is closely related to the resources
used in the firm and controlled by the entrepreneur. We interpret the default
value as a backyard technology that generates the present value λ ·yt. Notice
that diversion is still inefficient if λ is moderately greater than 1. This is
because to generate a one-time return from diversion, the ability of the firm
to generate profits and the capital stock are permanently lost.9
8The paper is related to the literature on optimal contracting with limited enforceability
as in Marcet & Marimon (1992), Kehoe & Levine (1993), Albuquerque & Hopenhayn
(1997), Alvarez & Jermann (2000), Cooley et al. (2000), Quintin (2000), Monge (2001).
9Other specifications of the default value are possible. For instance, we could have used
λ · k. While the model would have similar properties, our specification is more convenient
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Aggregate technology level and balanced growth path: The aggre-
gate technology level zt grows over time at rate gz. We assume that the
growth rate can take two values, gLz and g
H
z , with g
L
z < g
H
z , and it follows a
first order Markov chain. This is similar to the specification of the technol-
ogy shock made in many business cycle models. In this paper, however, we
deviate from the standard specification by allowing for regime switches.
We assume that the economy could be in two different regimes denoted
by i ∈ {1, 2}. The transition probability matrices for the growth rate of z
in these two regimes are Γ1(g
′
z/gz) and Γ2(g
′
z/gz) respectively. The regime
switch is governed by the transition probability matrix Υ(i′/i). We interpret
the 1990s as a regime switch that changed the expected future growth even
if the growth rate of z did not change. A similar specification has been used
in Danthine, Donaldson, & Johnsen (1998).
The growth in the aggregate level of technology zt allows the economy
to experience unbounded growth. To insure stationarity around some trend,
we need to make particular assumptions about the disutility from working,
ϕt(h), and the initial set up investment of a new firm, κt. Define 1 + gt =
(1 + gz,t)
1
1−θε where the parameter ε is the capital share parameter in the
function F (k, l) = kεl1−ε. Moreover, define At =
∏t
j=1(1 + gj). We assume
that the disutility from working takes the form ϕt(h)= χAth
ν . This particular
specification can be justified by interpreting the disutility from working as
the loss in home production where the home technology evolves similarly to
the market technology. Regarding the set up investment of a new firm we
assume that it takes the form κt = Atκ. Given these specifications of the
disutility from working and the set up investment, the economy will fluctuate
around the stochastic trend At. Therefore, all the endogenous variables with
unbounded growth will be detrended by the factor At.
Stock market value: Define R(zt, kt, wt) = (1−δ)kt +ztF (kt, l(kt, wt))θ−
wtl(kt, wt) as the firm’s resources at the beginning of period t + 1, after
the payment of wages.10 Using this function we can now define the firm’s
because all firms will choose the same capital-labor ratio independently of the production
scale. As shown in Section 4, this allows for a unique decomposition of productivity
gains between capital deepening and labor reallocation. Alternatively the default value
could also have an explicit forward looking component. As long as this forward looking
component is not too important, it would not change our main conclusion.
10Given the specification of the default value, the first order conditions show that the
capital labor ratio is only a function of the wage rate. This explains why the input of
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dividends with a more compact notation.
If the firm is not liquidated, it will pay the dividend R(zt−1, kt−1, wt−1)−
kt, where kt−1 was the capital invested in the previous period and kt is the
new capital input. If the firm is liquidated, there is no capital investment
and the dividend is R(zt−1, kt−1, wt−1). The (non-detrended) market value of
the firm, Pt, is the discounted value of the firm’s dividends, that is,
Pt =
(
1
1 + r
)
Et
∞∑
j=t
j−1∏
s=t
βs
[R(zj, kj, wj)− αφjkj+1] (4)
where βs = αφs/(1 + r). Notice that the capital investment is multiplied by
the survival probability αφj because in case of liquidation, the next period
capital is zero. Rearranging and dividing the whole expression by At, the
(detrended) market value of the firm is:
Pt = kt + Et
∞∑
j=t
j−1∏
s=t
βs(1 + gs+1)
[−kj + ( 1
1 + r
)
R(kj, wj)
]
(5)
where now all the variables are detrended.
Notice that, although the detrended payments do not display unbounded
growth, the detrended value of the firm depends on the expected future
growth rates: if the economy is expected to grow faster, future payments
will also grow at a higher rate. This, in turn, increases the value of the firm
today as shown in equation (5).
Timing summary: Before starting the analysis of the model, we summa-
rize here its timing. All the shocks are realized at the beginning of the period.
Therefore, agents’ death, firms’ death, next period’s survival probability, the
level of technology (for the new investment), and the growth regime become
known at the beginning of the period. Firms enter the period with resources
(1− δ) kt−1+zt−1F (kt−1, lt−1)θ. These resources are used to pay for the wages
of the workers hired in the previous period, wt−1lt−1, and to finance the new
capital kt (if the firm is still productive). What is left is paid as dividends.
At this stage the firm also decides the new input of labor, lt, and produc-
tion takes place. It is at this point that the entrepreneur decides whether
to repudiate the contract and divert the resources of the firm. Therefore,
labor does not depend on zt.
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the choice to default is made before observing zt+1. This timing convention
is convenient for the characterization of the optimal contract. Finally, it is
important to re-emphasize the timing of z. The firm knows the level of tech-
nology zt when it chooses the production inputs kt and lt. Therefore, there is
no uncertainty about the return from current investment. Only the returns
from future investments are uncertain.
3.1 The economy with enforceable contracts
We first characterize allocations when contracts are fully enforceable and the
entrepreneur is unable to divert the firm’s resources. In this case, all firms
will employ the same input of capital k̄ which is given by:
k̄ = arg max
k
{
−k +
(
1
1 + r
)
R(k, w)
}
. (6)
In this simple economy, the detrended wage is constant because there is a
constant number of firms (entrepreneurs) and the disutility from working
grows at the same rate as the whole economy.
A regime switch, that is, a change in the transition probability of g,
affects the value of a firm (because it affects the probability distribution of
future g′s). However, if the regime switch is not accompanied by a change
in the current value of g, it does not affect the real variables of the economy.
In contrast, we will see in the next section that when contracts are not
fully enforceable, a regime switch affects the production decisions and the
aggregate productivity of labor even if the actual growth rate of z does not
change.
3.2 The economy with limited enforceability
A contract specifies the payments to the entrepreneur, ct, the payment to
the investor, τt, and the capital investment, kt, for each history realization of
states. We assume that the payments to the entrepreneur cannot be negative.
Denote by qt the value of the contract for the entrepreneur and by St the
total surplus. All these variables are detrended by At =
∏t
j=1(1 + gj). Also,
denote by s the aggregate states of the economy plus the individual survival
probability φ. The contractual problem can be written recursively as follows:
S(s, q) = max
k,c(s′),q(s′)
{
−k +
(
1
1 + r
)
R(k, w(s)) + βE(1 + g′)S(s′, q(s′))
}
(7)
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subject to
q = βE(1 + g′)
[
c(s′) + q(s′)
]
(8)
q ≥ D(k, w(s)) (9)
c(s′) ≥ 0, q(s′) ≥ 0 (10)
The function S(s, q) is the end-of-period surplus of the contract, net of the
cost of capital. If we invest k—which is a cost—the discounted gross revenue
paid in the next period is (1/(1+r))R(k, w(s)). Notice that the discount fac-
tor β = αφ/(1+ r) is known in the current period but changes stochastically
over time because it depends on φ.
Condition (8) is the promise-keeping constraint, (9) is the enforceability
constraint (incentive-compatibility) and (10) imposes the non-negativity of
the payments to the entrepreneur. The term (1+g′) comes from the detrend-
ing procedure and the prime denotes next period variables. In formulating
the above problem we take as given the optimal policy when the firm is liq-
uidated. This policy consists of setting consumption and continuation utility
equal to zero. This is the optimal policy given that the entrepreneur will
permanently loose the ability to run a firm in future periods.
Coherently with the formulation of the surplus function, the aggregate
states of the economy are given by the current growth in the aggregate level
of technology, gz, the current regime governing the future growth rates of
technology, i, and the distribution (measure) of firms over φ and q. The
recursive problem can be solved once we know the wage rate w(s) and the
distribution function (law of motion) for the aggregate states which we denote
by s′ ∼ H(s).
Denote by µ the Lagrange multiplier associated with the promise-keeping
constraint (8) and denote by γ the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
enforceability constraint (9). Conditional on the survival of the firm, the first
order conditions are:(
1
1 + r
)
Rk(k, w(s))− 1− γDk(k, w(s)) = 0 (11)
µ(s′) + γ − µ = 0 for all s′ (12)
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µ− γ ≥ 0, (= if c(s′) > 0) (13)
βE(1 + g′)
[
c(s′) + q(s′)
]
− q = 0 (14)
q −D(k, w(s)) ≥ 0 (= if γ > 0) (15)
Condition (13), combined with condition (12), implies that the payment
to the entrepreneur c(s′) is zero if the next period Lagrange multiplier µ(s′) is
greater than zero. This has a simple intuition. Because µ decreases when the
enforceability constraint is binding (see condition (12)), when µ(s′) reaches
the value of zero, the enforceability constraint will not be binding in future
periods, that is, γ = 0 for all possible realizations of s′. In this case the
firm will always employ the optimal input of capital k̄(s) as shown in (11).
Therefore, when µ(s′) = 0, the firm is unconstrained.
Before reaching the unconstrained status, however, the enforceability con-
straint (9) can be binding in future periods and γ is greater than zero in some
contingencies. This implies that the firm will employ a sub-optimal input of
capital and labor. Moreover, in those periods in which the enforceability
constraint is binding, condition (15) is satisfied with equality (and zero pay-
ments to the entrepreneur, unless the unconstrained status is reached that
period). Therefore, this condition determines the growth pattern of the firm.
The following proposition states these properties more formally.
Proposition 3.1 There exists q(s) such that,
(a) The function S(s, q) is increasing and concave in q ≤ q(s).
(b) Capital input is the minimum between k = D−1(q, w(s)) and k̄(s).
(c) If q ≤ βE(1 + g′)q(s′), the entrepreneur’s payment c(s′) is zero.
(d) If q > βE(1 + g′)q(s′), there are multiple solutions to c(s′).
Proof 3.1 Using the change of variable x = kθ, we can show that problem
(7) is a standard concave problem. To see this, let’s observe first that the
optimal capital-output ratio chosen by the firm is only a function of the wage
and interest rates. Therefore, the production function can be written as y =
z ·kθ ·ψ(w, r) and, with the change of variable y = z ·x ·ψ(w, r). This implies
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that constraint (9) is linear in x. Because the return function is concave
in x and all the other constraints are linear functions of states and choice
variables, problem (7) is a standard concave problem. The uniqueness of the
function S(s, q) can be proved by showing that the optimization problem is a
contraction. The concavity derives from the fact that the recursion preserves
concavity. The other properties derive directly from the first order conditions
(11)-(15). Q.E.D.
Therefore, the dynamics of the firm have a simply structure. The promised
value and the input of capital grow on average until the entrepreneur’s value
reaches q(s). At this point the input of capital is always kept at the opti-
mal level k̄(s) and the total value of the firm, after capital investment, is
P (s) = k̄(s) + S(s, q(s)).
3.2.1 Initial conditions
After characterizing the surplus function, we can now derive the initial condi-
tions of the contract. Assuming competition in financial markets, the initial
contract solves:
q0(s) = max q (16)
s.t. S(s, q)− q ≥ κ
This problem maximizes the value of the contract for the entrepreneur, q,
subject to the participation constraint for the investor, S(s, q)− q ≥ κ. The
solution to this problem is unique. In fact, the function S(s, q) is increasing
and concave, and for q ≥ q(s) its slope is zero. Therefore, above some q, the
function S(s, q)− q is strictly decreasing in q. This implies that the solution
is unique and satisfies the zero-profit condition S(s, q)− q = κ.
The determination of the initial value of q is shown in Figure 7. This figure
plots the value of the contract for the investor, S(s, q) − q, as a function of
q. The initial value of q—and therefore, the initial input of capital—is given
by the point in which the curve crosses the set up investment κ.
From Figure 7 it is easy to see how the initial conditions of the contract
are affected by an increase in the value of new firms. This is captured by an
upward shift in the value of the contract for the investor, that is, the function
S(s, q)− q. The new investor’s value intersects κ at a higher level of q, and
therefore, q0(s) increases. Because higher values of q are associated with
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S(s, q)− q
κ
q
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r
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Figure 7: Initial conditions of the optimal contract.
higher values of k (remember that for constrained firms q = D(k, w)), this
will increase the initial investment of new firms, and therefore, the aggregate
stock of capital and employment will be higher. In the quantitative exercise
conducted in Section 4, the increase in the value of a firm (stock market
boom) is generated by a regime switch that increases the likelihood of higher
future growth rates.
3.2.2 General equilibrium
We provide here the definition of a recursive general equilibrium. The suf-
ficient set of aggregate states are given by the current growth rate gz, the
current growth regime, i, and the distribution (measure) of firms over φ and
q, denoted by M . We denote the aggregate states plus the individual survival
probability by s = (gz, i,M, φ).
Definition 3.1 (Recursive equilibrium) A recursive competitive equilib-
rium is defined as a set of functions for (i) consumption c(s) and working
hours h(s) from workers; (ii) contract surplus S(s, q), investment k(s, q),
consumption c(s, q)(s′) and wealth evolution q(s, q)(s′) for entrepreneurs; (iii)
initial condition for a new firm q0(s); (iv) wage w(s); (v) aggregate demand
of labor from firms and aggregate supply from workers; (vi) aggregate in-
vestment from firms and aggregate savings from workers and entrepreneurs;
(vii) distribution function (law of motion) s′ ∼ H(s). Such that: (i) the
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household’s decisions are optimal; (ii) entrepreneur’s investment, consump-
tion and wealth evolution satisfy the optimality conditions of the financial
contract (conditions (11)-(15)), and the surplus satisfies the Bellman’s equa-
tion (7); (iii) the wage is the equilibrium clearing price in the labor market;
(iv) the capital market clears (investment equals savings); (v) the law of mo-
tion H(s) is consistent with the individual decisions and the stochastic process
for gz and φ.
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model and study how a regime switch that
leads to higher expected future growth rates—the New Economy—impacts
on the macro performance of the economy.
4.1 Calibration
Growth process and simulated experiment: The transition probabil-
ity matrix for the regime switch is specified as:
Υ(i′/i) =
[
ρ 1− ρ
1− ρ ρ
]
while the conditional transition probability matrices for gz are:
Γ1(g
′
z/gz) =
[
1 0
p 1− p
]
, Γ2(g
′
z/gz) =
[
1− p p
0 1
]
If ρ > 0.5, the expected future growth rates are higher under the second
regime independently of the current growth rate. In the quantitative exercise
we assume that ρ ≈ 1 and we consider several values of p.
We denote by x = (gz, i) the couple with the growth rate of z and the
current regime i. The state x can take four values. We interpret the state
(gLz , 1) as the state prevailing during the period 1972:2-1995:4 and the state
(gLz , 2) as the one prevailing during the period 1995:4-2000:4. Finally, the
state (gHz , 2) is interpreted as the new economy.
Consistent with this interpretation, we use the growth rate in trend pro-
ductivity during the period 1972:2-1995:5 to calibrate gLz . As reported in
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Table 1, the trend growth in labor productivity during this period was 1.4%
per year. Therefore, we set gL = (gLz )
1/(1−θε) = 0.014. The value of gHz is
the growth rate in the “New Economy”. According to the citation in Ip
& Schlesinger (2001), the New Economy was believed to grow at rates ex-
ceeding the previous rates by as much as 1.5 percent. Accordingly, we set
gH = (gHz )
1/(1−θε) = 0.029.
Formally, our computational exercise consists of simulating the artificial
economy for the following sequence of realized states:
xt =

(gLz , 1), for t = −∞ : 0
(gLz , 2), for t = 1 : N
In words, we assume that the economy has been in the state x = (gLz , 1)
for a long period of time. This period has been sufficiently long for the
economy to converge to the long-term equilibrium associated with this state.
Starting from this initial equilibrium, there is a regime switch and the new
state becomes x = (gL, 2). We will then consider a sequence of realizations of
this state and we compute the continuation equilibrium for the following N
periods. Therefore, after the regime switch, the level of technology continues
to grow at rate gLz for several periods even though in each period there is
a positive probability of transiting to gH (New Economy). Although these
are very extreme assumptions, they capture the main idea of the paper, that
is, the fact that in the 1990s the likelihood of a New Economy increased.
This shift in expectations was driven by the rapid diffusion of information
and communication technologies. The assumption underlying the numerical
exercise is that the growth rate of technology did not change. Only the
expectations about the new regime have changed. This assumption allows
us to isolate the mechanism described in the paper from the effects of direct
technological improvements.
The other parameters: The period in the model is one year. The in-
tertemporal discount rate (equal to the interest rate) is set to r = 0.02 and
the survival probability to α = 0.99. Notice that firms’ profits are discounted
more heavily than r because firms survive with probability αφ. We will report
on the sensitivity of the results with respect to r.
The detrended disutility from working takes the form ϕ(l) = χ · lν and the
supply of labor is determined by the first order condition νχlν−1 = w/(1+r).
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The elasticity of labor with respect to the wage rate is 1/(ν − 1). Blundell
& MaCurdy (1999) provide an extensive survey of studies that estimate this
elasticity. For men, the estimates range between 0 and 0.2, while for married
women they range between 0 and 1. Based on these numbers, we set ν = 3
which implies an elasticity of 0.5. In the sensitivity analysis we will consider
alternative values. After fixing ν, the parameter χ is chosen so that one third
of available time is spent working.
The fraction of agents with entrepreneurial skills e determines the ratio
of workers to firms, which affects the level of the equilibrium wage rate.
However, for the quantities we are interested in, this parameter is irrelevant11
The production function is specified as (kεl1−ε)θ. Atkeson, Khan, & Oha-
nian (1996) provide some discussion justifying a value of θ = 0.85. This is
also the value used by Atkeson & Kehoe (2001). The parameter ε, then, is
set so that the labor income share is close to 0.6. For unconstrained firms the
labor income share is equal to θ(1−ε). Because most of the production comes
from unconstrained firms, we use this condition to calibrate ε. Using the first
order condition for the optimal input of capital (which is satisfied for uncon-
strained firms), the depreciation rate can be expressed as δ = θε/(K/Y )− r.
With a capital-output ratio of 2.5 and the above parameterization of θ, ε and
r, the depreciation rate is δ = 0.08.12
We assume that the survival probability φ takes two values, φ and φ,
with φ < φ. When firms are born, their initial survival rate is φ. Over
time, these firms may mature with some probability ξ and their survival
probability becomes φ forever. This allows us to capture the dependence of
the firm survival on age. We set φ = 0.91 and φ = 0.99. Together with the
one percent probability that the entrepreneur dies, these numbers imply that
new firms face a 10 percent probability of exit while the exit probability of
mature firms is 2 percent. These numbers are broadly consistent with the
U.S. data for the manufacturing and business service sector as reported by
OECD (2001). According to this source, only 50% of entrant firms are still
alive after 7 years which is consistent with the 10% yearly probability of exit
assumed for new firms. After parameterizing φ and φ, the probability that a
firm becomes mature is set such that the average exit rate is 6 percent. This
11Whatever the value of e, we can set χ so that the working hours satisfy the calibration
target of one third, and the labor market is in equilibrium.
12Notice that the economy-wide capital-output ratio will not be exactly 2.5 because in
the economy there are also constrained firms. However, because the production share of
constrained firms is small, these numbers will not be very different from the targets.
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is in the range of values resulting from several empirical studies about firms’
turnover as in Evans (1987) and OECD (2001).
Two other parameters need to be calibrated: the default parameter λ and
the set up investment κ. These two parameters are important to determine
the initial size of new firms: larger are these parameters and smaller is the
initial size of new firms. Our calibration target is to have an initial size which
is 25% of the average size of incumbent firms. This is somewhat larger than
the value of 15% reported by OECD (2001) for the U.S. business sector. We
allow for this discrepancy because our model does not incorporate all the
factors that could possibly explain the small size of new firms. For instance,
learning is one of these factors. The parameter λ is especially important to
determine the feasible range of the size distribution of firms. In particular,
for small values of λ, the initial size of new firms can not be very small. A
value of λ = 3 allows us to reach our calibration target for the initial size
of new firms. After setting λ = 3, we determine the value of κ such that k0
is 25% the capital of incumbent firms.13 The full set of parameter values is
reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameter values.
Survival probability of agents α = 0.99
Intertemporal discount rate r = 0.02
Disutility from working ϕ(h) ≡ χ · hν χ = 0.002, ν = 3
Survival probability of projects φ ∈ {0.91, 0.99}, ξ = 0.021
Production technology (kεl1−ε)θ θ = 0.85, ε = 0.294
Growth process g ∈ {0.014, 0.029}, ρ ≈ 0
Depreciation rate δ = 0.08
Set up investment κ = 0.44
Default parameter λ = 3
13Larger values of λ (and smaller values of κ) would reduce the speed of convergence to
the unconstrained status but would not change the main results of the paper. However,
there are some constraints on how large λ could be. Indeed, for very large λ, the value of
defaulting can become larger than the value of the firm.
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4.2 Simulation results
Figures 8 and 9 plot the detrended responses of several variables after the
economy switches to the second regime but z continues to grow at gLz . Several
values of p are considered.
The impulse responses plotted in Figure 8 show the set of events through
which the expectations about the New Economy leads to an improvement in
the productivity of labor. First, the higher value of p increases the value of
firms and generates a stock market boom (plot a). We will comment below
how the model can generate this large stock market boom. After the stock
market boom, new firms get higher initial financing and hire more labor (plot
b). With the exception of the first period, this implies that the demand of
labor increases and pushes up the wage rate (plot c).14 A higher wage rate
induces unconstrained firms to reduce employment (plot d). Also, the higher
wage rate increases the intensity of capital (plot e). As a result of these
events, the productivity of labor increases as shown in panel f.
The productivity improvement derives in part from the reallocation of
labor to younger firms (reallocation effect) and in part from the increase in
capital intensity (capital deepening effect). Given that all firms run the same
production technology z(kεl1−ε)θ and choose the same capital-labor ratio, the
aggregate productivity of labor can be written as:
LabProd = z
(
K
L
)θε∑
i
ωil
θ−1
i (17)
where li is the labor employed by each firm of type i and ωi is the share
of aggregate labor employed by all firms of type i. Taking logs and first
14In the first period the demand of labor decreases because old firms that are still
financially constrained reduce their investment. This investment reaction of constrained
old firms derives from the features of the optimal contract. In this contract investment
is state contingent. When the economy is in an expansionary path and the wage rate
will eventually increase, the optimal size of firms decreases. On the other hand, when
the economy is in a recession path and the wage rate decreases, the optimal size of firms
tends to increase. This implies that the growth incentive for the firm is lower when the
economy is expanding. Anticipating this, the optimal contract recommends higher levels
of investments when the economy is in a recession path and lower levels of investment
when the economy is in an expansionary path. The negative investment effect coming
from existing constrained firms will be overturned later on by the entrance of new firms.
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differences we get:
∆log(LabProd) = ∆logz + θε∆log
(
K
L
)
+ ∆log
(∑
i
ωil
θ−1
i
)
(18)
The first element on the right-hand-size is constant because the growth rate
of z does not change in our simulation exercise. The second element is the
contribution of capital deepening while the third is the contribution of labor
reallocation.
In the model, when p = 0.2, labor productivity increases by about 2.3%
during the five years following the regime switch. Of this increase, about
half is generated by capital deepening and the other half by the reallocation
effect. As we have seen in Section 1, this corresponds roughly to about half of
the actual productivity acceleration experienced by the U.S. economy during
the second half of 1990s.
We would like to emphasize that it is common in growth accounting to
use a constant return-to-scale production function to determine multifactor
productivity as the residual contribution to output growth not accounted for
by the different factors of production. The application of this procedure to
data generated by our model requires the imposition of θ = 1 and would
mistakenly attribute the reallocation effect (the last term of equation (18))
to multifactor productivity.
Figure 9 shows the impact of the regime switch on other macroeconomic
variables. With the exception of the first period, employment and production
increase persistently. Panel c shows that the wage or labor share of output
also increases after the regime switch as a consequence of the higher wages.
The last panel plots the fraction of firms that are not financially constrained.
As can be seen, this fraction increases after the regime switch. This is another
way to see how the stock market boom relaxes the tightness of financial
constraints.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we document the sensitivity of our quantitative results to
changes in the interest rates, r, the labor supply elasticity, 1/ (ν − 1), and
the degree of returns to scale, θ. We also provides an example that further
illustrates the magnitude of the reallocation mechanism.
As we have seen in the previous section, the model can generate large
stock market booms after small changes in the switching probability p. The
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calibration of the interest rate r and the survival probability φ are key for
generating these large asset price effects. To see this, consider the steady
state value of a firm once it reaches the unconstrained status:
P =
d
1−
(
αφ
1+r
)
(1 + g)
(19)
Here d denotes the detrended values of dividends which is constant in the
steady state. The term αφ/(1 + r) is the discount factor. This factor is
multiplied by 1 + g because dividends are detrended. As can be seen in
equation (19), the value of the firm gets more responsive to changes in g as
the term
(
αφ
1+r
)
(1 + g) approaches 1. Because this term depends negatively
on the interest rate, smaller is r and larger is the price sensitivity to g.
The requirement for a sizable stock market increase partly motivates our
specification of the survival probability φ as taking two values φ and φ̄.
Having a low survival probability for young firms allows us to generate the
empirically observed high turnover rates even if mature firms have a low exit
rate. The high survival rate of mature firms is important to generate large
stock price movements because a large fraction of the market capitalization
comes from these firms.
Figure 10 plots the stock market value and other variables for different
values of the interest rates. In these impulse responses the value of the
switching probability is p = 0.2. If we reduce the interest rate to 1.5% from
our benchmark value of 2%, then we can generate a stock market boom
that is close to 100 percent. When the interest rate is 3%, instead, the
stock market boom is much smaller. Notice that even if the impact on the
stock market is very sensitive to the interest rate, the impact of the market
boom on productivity does not change much. This is because the stock
market boom obtained in the baseline model already eliminates almost all
the financial restrictions faced by new firms. The economy is close to a
frictionless economy and further increases in the stock market have a modest
impact on the real sector.
Figure 11 and 12 show sensitivity to changes in the labor supply elasticity
and the curvature of the production function. For the labor supply elasticity,
Figure 11 plots the impulse responses of the stock market and productivity for
different values of the parameter ν. When labor is not very elastic, the regime
switch has a larger effect on productivity but a smaller effect on aggregate
employment and production. Figure 12 presents the sensitivity analysis with
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respect to the returns to scale parameter θ. In changing θ we also change
λ and κ so that the initial size of new firms is the same as in the previous
calibration. When θ is small, and thus the production function more concave,
the expectation of higher future growth generates larger productivity gains
and larger impacts on the aggregate economy. These results confirm our
discussion in Section 2.
To get a better understanding about the quantitative importance of our
reallocation effect on the productivity of labor, we present here a simple
example. Assume that there are only two types of firms: small constrained
firms and large unconstrained firms. A small firm employs l1 units of labor
and a large firm employs l2 units of labor. Given n the fraction of small
firms, the average (per-firm) employment is equal to l = n · l1 + (1− n) · l2.
The reallocation term derived in equation (18) can be written as:
∆log
∑
i=1,2
siL
θ−1
i
 = (θ−1)∆log(l)+∆log
n( l1
l
)θ
+ (1− n)
(
l2
l
)θ (20)
The first term on the right-hand-side is a “level effect”: given decreasing
returns to scale, larger average scales reduce productivity. The second term
on the right-hand-side is the “relative reallocation effect”: the smaller the
difference in size between small and large firms, the greater is the productivity
of labor. As we have shown in the previous section, a stock market boom
induces both a level effect (increase in the average size of firms l) and a
relative reallocation effect (increase in l1/l and decrease in l2/l).
In our calibration, we have set θ = 0.85. With this value of θ, if the
average labor supply increases by 1%, the average productivity of labor falls
by 0.15%. In the baseline model the supply of labor increases by about 3%.
Therefore, the level effect reduces productivity by about 0.45%. Table 3
shows the increase in productivity due to the relative reallocation effect (last
term in equation 20), from eliminating all financial frictions. We consider
several initial values of n and l1/l2 and the elimination of all the financial
frictions implies l1/l = l2/l = 1. This is the maximal effect that can be
obtained through the relative reallocation mechanism.
As can be seen from the table, for the particular range of initial conditions,
the potential gains in productivity due to the relative reallocation mechanism
are much larger than the losses in productivity induced by the level effect.
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Table 3: Relative reallocation effect from eliminating all the financial con-
straints. The value of θ is 0.85.
n = 0.3 n = 0.4 n = 0.5 n = 0.6
l1
l2
= 0.1 3.04 4.15 5.29 6.41
l1
l2
= 0.2 1.98 2.62 3.21 3.70
l1
l2
= 0.3 1.31 1.68 2.00 2.21
5 Additional empirical evidence
The quantitative analysis in the previous section demonstrates our model’s
ability to replicate the facts documented in Section 1. Here we want to
show that our model is also consistent with additional empirical observations
characterizing the 1990s.
Value of new firms: A key feature of our story is that new firms receive
greater initial financing and are thus able to generate higher initial values
compared to incumbent firms. The entrance of new firms in our model can
be interpreted as the moment in which firms get equity financing, either in
the preliminary stage of venture capital financing or in the public offering
stage. This last stage can be approximated by the moment in which firms get
listed in the stock market. Interpreted in this way, recent data from Fama
& French (2001) supports our story.
Fama & French (2001) document the market values of newly listed firms
relative to incumbent firms. According to their study, the average market
value of a newly listed firm has increased relative to the market value of an
incumbent (publicly listed) firm. As shown in Table 4, during the 1990s, the
market value of a new firm listed in the New York Stock Exchange was on
average equivalent to the market value of a firm located at the 17.5 percentile
of incumbent firms. During the 1980s, in contrast, the average value of
newly listed firms was located at the 8.2 percentile. A similar pattern can
be observed for new listings in local exchanges.
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Table 4: Average market value of new listed firms relative to incumbents.
Number of Ave percentile Ave percentile
new listings NYSE Local Exchanges
1973-1979 149 9.3 45.2
1980-1989 573 8.2 48.3
1990-2000 622 17.5 55.5
Source: Fama & French (2001)
Pattern of labor share: Another feature of the model shown in panel c
of Figure 9, is that the labor share of income increases after a stock market
boom. This is also an empirical feature of the data as shown by Figure 13. As
can be seen from this figure, the wage share of business income has increased
in the second half of the 1990s. The ability of the model to capture this
feature of the data will be emphasized in the next section when we discuss
alternative models.
Reallocation mechanism: We provide here some more direct evidence in
support of the reallocation mechanism. Table 5 reports some concentration
indices for the manufacturing sector for the years 1992 and 1997. These
indices are constructed using data from the 1992 and the 1997 Economic
Census (which is conducted every 5 years). These indices are reported for
five classes of manufacturing firms: the 50 largest; the 51st to 100th largest;
the 101st to 150th largest; the 151st to 200th largest; and the remaining
smaller firms. The ranking is based on value added.
Table 5 shows that the employment share of the 1997 largest firms has
decreased relative to 1992. This tendency can also be observed in terms of
shares of new capital expenditures. Therefore, according to this table, the
right tail of the size distribution seems to have shrunk in relative terms. This
pattern is consistent with our reallocation mechanism.
Table 5 also reveals another pattern which is worth to be emphasized.
Although the share of employment of the 50 largest firms has decreased,
the share of value added has not decreased. At the same time, when we
look at the class of smaller firms, the increase in the share of value added is
smaller than the increase in share of employment. This seems to suggest
that the labor productivity of the largest firms has increased relative to
the productivity of smaller firms, which is consistent with our reallocation
mechanism.
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Table 5: Share of Industry Statistics for Companies Ranked by Value Added.
Total Production workers Value New capital
employees Total Hours Wages added expenditures
1992 Economic Census
50 largest 13.0 12.8 12.9 19.3 23.7 21.8
51st to 100th largest 4.5 4.3 4.4 5.4 8.4 10.8
101st to 150th largest 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.9 5.5 6.8
151st to 200th largest 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 5.7
Other firms 75.8 75.5 75.3 66.8 58.3 55.0
1997 Economic Census
50 largest 11.7 10.6 11.1 16.8 24.0 21.3
51st to 100th largest 4.4 4.2 4.4 5.2 7.7 7.3
101st to 150th largest 3.6 3.7 3.7 4.4 5.2 5.3
151st to 200th largest 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.8 4.1
Other firms 77.5 78.6 77.7 70.4 59.3 62.0
Source: Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing: 1992 and 1997 Economic Census
Other empirical considerations: Although these patterns seem consis-
tent with our mechanism, some caution is needed in comparing the predic-
tions of the model with the data. For simplicity we have assumed that all
firms operate the same technology and there is only one optimal scale of
production. As a result, there is a one-to-one mapping between the tightness
of the financial constraints and the size of a firm. In the real economy firms
are also heterogeneous in their optimal scale. This would be captured by
the model if firms were heterogeneous not only in their financial status but
also in z. If firms are heterogeneous in z, size is no longer an indicator of
financial constraints. In fact, it is possible that firms with high values of z
are on average larger but they are more financially constrained in the sense
that their production scale is (relatively) farther from the optimal scale than
for smaller firms.
Finally, we should also qualify one property of the model that may seem
at odd with micro data. Several empirical studies have found that labor
tends to be more productive in larger firms. The decreasing return feature
of our model, instead, implies that the productivity of labor decreases in
size. This inconsistency is only apparent because, as observed above, the
size of firms in our model does not coincide with the size of firms in the
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data. If we allow for heterogeneity in z, it could be possible to structure
the model such that firms with large z’s are larger on average but are also
more financially constrained, and therefore, they are more productive. More
than size, a better comparison with the data is along the age dimension.
Haltiwanger, Lane, & Spletzer (1999) study a sample of single establishment
firms and find that productivity falls during the first six years of life. This
feature is captured by our model because over time new firm expand and get
less financially constrained.
6 Alternative models
In this section, we discuss briefly whether some alternative modelling features
commonly used in the business cycle literature would be able to replicate
the type of responses generated by our model after a regime switch. In
particular, we will discuss two modelling features: capital adjustment costs
and intertemporal consumption smoothing.
Models with adjustment cost: Consider a standard adjustment cost
model. In this model there is a continuum of firms with constant returns to
scale maximizing the discounted values of profits and subject to adjustment
costs to capital. For simplicity we maintain the assumption that agents
are risk-neutral as in our model. Consumption smoothing will be discussed
below. In this model, a regime switch that increases the expected future
growth generates an immediate investment boom even if the productivity of
the current investment does not change. This is because with adjustment
costs to capital it is optimal to smooth investment.
This model is able to generate an increase in labor productivity but only
through capital deepening. In fact, because of constant returns to scale,
multifactor productivity does not change. Furthermore, this model cannot
explain the increase in the labor income share that we have observed in the
second half of the 1990s.
Notice that the alternative assumption of decreasing returns to scale
would not help. In fact, due to the absence of idiosyncratic shocks, all firms
operate at the same scale. Again, a regime switch will increase investment
and expand the scale of production. However, the overall productivity of
labor does not necessarily increase. On the one hand, workers will have more
capital, which has a positive effects on productivity. On the other, the in-
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crease in the scale of production decreases productivity. In this environment,
if we were to measure the change in multifactor productivity assuming con-
stant returns to scale, we would conclude that the asset price boom generates
a fall in multifactor productivity.
Models with consumption smoothing: Our model abstracts from con-
sumption smoothing considerations which can play an important role in many
business cycle models. Danthine et al. (1998) extend a standard Real Busi-
ness Cycle model by allowing for a regime switch similar to ours. Within
their framework a positive regime switch would induce a recession (lower
levels of investments, hours and outputs) rather than an expansion. The in-
tuition for this result is simple. Because of the wealth effect, agents save less
and consume more leisure. Consequently, production and investment fall.15
An important question, then, is whether introducing a motive for con-
sumption smoothing into our model could overturn our results. There are
two factors to consider. First, the wealth effect on leisure will reduce the
supply of labor. This would make the reallocation effect larger because the
wage rate increases more. Second, the incentive to increase consumption
will raise the interest rate and will reduce the impact of the higher expected
growth rates on asset prices. However, as long as the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is greater than 1, the market value of firms will eventually
increase and this will lead to additional funding for new firms. Thus, in this
case, our qualitative results will not be overturned.16
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model with financial market
frictions in which stock market booms can generate an economic expansion
with gains in productivity. The reaction of the economy to a stock market
boom is consistent with the 1990s expansion of the US economy characterized
15Danthine et al. (1998) reports only the results for the case in which there is a fall in
expectations. By symmetry, higher expectations should lead to a recession.
16The important condition is that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater
than one. With CRRA preferences this would require a low degree of risk aversion. How-
ever, by using Epstain-Zin preferences, we could have a high elasticity of substitution and
a high risk aversion. See Bansal & Yaron (2002) for an application of these preferences to
the study of asset prices.
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by higher investment, higher productivity, higher employment and higher
production. This interpretation of the U.S. expansion may coexist with the
more traditional view which assigns a direct role to technological improve-
ments related to information and communication technologies as in Cooley
& Yorukoglu (2001). However, the recent survey of Baily (2002) points out
that, although information and communication technologies were important
for the productivity revival of the 1990s, other factors must have also played
an important role. Our paper provides a complementary explanation for
these productivity gains which is also consistent with the view of more re-
cent studies emphasizing the “business reorganization” induced by greater
competition. (See McKinsey Global Institute (2001) and Lewis, Palmade,
Regout, & Webb (2002)). Our view is that the driving force of this greater
competition was the asset price boom experienced by the U.S. economy in
the second half of the 1990s. The asset price boom allowed the financing of
more investment for constrained firms and generated a reallocation of labor
from less productive (unconstrained) firms to more productive ones.
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Appendix: computation of equilibrium
Equations (11)-(15) with the initial condition q + κ = S(s, q) provide the
basic conditions that need to be satisfied by the optimal contract. If we
knew the terms E(1 + g′)q(s′) and E(1 + g′)S(s′, q′), these conditions would
be sufficient to solve the model. The numerical procedure, then, is based on
the parametrization of these two functions on a grid of values for µ. The
chosen parametrization depends on the particular problem we try to solve.
In the computation of the transitional equilibrium, we assume that ρ = 0.
Therefore, when there is the regime switch, the economy continues to stay in
that regime. Moreover, if the economy switches to the high growth rate, it
will continue to growth at this rate forever. The equilibrium computed under
these assumptions is an approximation to the case in which ρ is not very
different from zero as assumed in the calibration section. A more detailed
description of the numerical procedure is available upon request from the
authors.
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Figure 1 - Growth of macroeconomic variables
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Figure 2 - Stock market indeces
(Avergare of daily closing)
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Figure 3 - Productivity growth and price-earning ratio
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Fugure 4 - Stock market and venture capital
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Figure 5 - Funds raised and number of Initial Public Offerings 
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Figure 8: Impulse responses after the regime switch.
4
Figure 9: Impulse responses after the regime switch.
Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis for interest rates.
5
Figure 11: Sensitivity analysis for the elasticity of labor.
Figure 12: Sensitivity analysis for the curvature of the production function.
6
Figure 13 - Wage share in the business sector
(Percent of business income)
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